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INTRODUCTION 
According to Nassim Nicholas Taleb (Musgrave, 2009), while a Black Swan event is rare and 
seemingly random, there would be some clear indications, which can be observed with the benefit 
of hindsight.  
For the purpose of this study, a Black Swan event has been defined as any period of seven 
consecutive days during which the difference between the maximum and minimum values of a 
particular stock exchange is greater than or equal to 10 per cent of the maximum value.  
Given this criterion, seven Black Swan events have been studied across the world, chosen for their 
uniqueness and their ability to, at least in part, influence major equity markets.  
It is crucial to be able to identify how much of data before the actual event is relevant to the event 
itself. It would be prudent to separate short-term and long-term indicators, with the effect of each 
measured and prioritised for developing an accurate and reliable algorithm. Short-term indicators, 
for the duration of this study, have been defined as those appearing a maximum of five days before 
the steepest decline in the values of the concerned stock index in the specific time frame, while 
long-term indicators have been defined as those appearing twenty to five days before the steepest 
decline in the values.  
The other significant attribute to be measured was the extent of early warning plausible at any 
given point in time. In other words, we needed to establish how early it was possible and reliable 
to predict a Black Swan event before it actually occurs. While any early warning would be 
welcome, it is logical to want to maximise the time between the warning and the event while 
making sure that the required reliability is achieved.  
Intuitive thinking might lead us to consider moderate time periods of twenty or twenty-five years, 
considering each set of those many years to be a phase in the macroeconomic history of the world.  
Through trial and error, we decided to select the period from FY 1997 to FY 2019 for the purpose 
of this study. During this time period, a total of seven global events have been observed within the 
period under consideration. Notably, every event has been considered from the point of view of 
the S&P 500 index – meaning that the impact of every event has been considered from the point 
of view of the US stock market.  
Following are the events in detail and the reason for their consideration. This information was 
largely sourced from an article on the history of Black Swan events (Faisal Khan, 2019): 
 
1. Asian Market Real Estate Crisis (1997) – The most relevant example of the demonstration of 
the interdependence of Asian markets in the recent times has occurred in 1997 with the 
prominent East Asian and South East Asian emerging economies facing a sudden shock when 
the real estate price bubble burst, starting with Thailand. The property prices in Thailand had 
entered an era of rampant price rise for years at a stretch, on the back of strong internal growth 
and foreign investment. However, as is the case with a lot of developing economies, it became 
uncontrollably volatile to the point that the prices rose to absurd levels. This inevitably caused 
a property price crash due to the bursting of the bubble, wiping out close to 70 per cent wealth 
in the stock market of Thailand. Since the South East Asian economies were, and still continue 
to be, closely interconnected, a similar demand side shock to property prices was observed in 
economies like South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. The crisis that had begun to 
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rear its head in the initial months of 1997 was the biggest drop in stock prices in the respective 
markets in generations. It had shown early indications, as much as a year prior to the actual 
crisis, but as is the case with a lot of examples we observed, the general investor erred on the 
side of optimism, causing the bubble to swell up even more and hence bursting more 
devastatingly. This crisis was exacerbated with the contractionary policy of the US Federal 
Reserve, thus cutting off liquidity across the financial world. The countries were bailed out by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with short duration loans of over a 100 billion US 
dollars under a lot of rigid clauses, eventually causing the economies to bounce back in the 
coming five years to regain their initial momentum. 
 
2. The Dot Com Bust (2000) – Nearing the new millennium, hopes were high for the rapidly 
growing phenomenon of the internet. This caused a frenzy in the then adolescent Silicon 
Valley, with investors willing to put their money behind anything that resembled an internet 
application. This went beyond the point of healthy optimism to the point of sheer wishful 
thinking, to be able to think that so many companies competing directly could survive in a 
competitive environment, even in the late twentieth century. The US stock markets swelled up 
with the infusion of so much capital into these organisations, with its value increasing more 
than five-fold in five years. The infamous NASDAQ peak at 5,048 was followed by a free-for-
all, with investors dumping stocks of big and small companies alike. Unsustainable growth in 
prices can be identified as one of the primary reasons for this sudden drop, in which the markets 
inevitably readjusted themselves based on the inherent value being traded. This was a sustained 
drop as compared to other crises, which were more sudden in nature. Just as the unprecedented, 
unrealistic and hollow inflation in the stock prices took place over a period of five years, so 
did the eventual readjustment due to the gradual disillusionment of investors who had expected 
a double-digit growth in tech companies, which, incidentally, also followed a pattern of five 
years. Although as we observe, since that time, more robust and stable tech companies like 
Alphabet (Google) and Apple Inc. have showed that investment in technology is still as 
lucrative as ever, other so-called tech companies like WeWork have brought back the bitter 
taste of Dot Com Bust due to the unrealistic expectations of investors for larger-than-life 
personalities and ideas instead of a robust study of business fundamentals and a solid plan.  
 
3. Stock Market Crash after the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks – This is a Black Swan event due to sudden 
and unnatural circumstances, similar to the earlier discussion about wars and conflicts affecting 
the nature of the stock market, which is largely governed by emotions even in the modern era. 
Having just managed to regain a foothold since the dot com bust barely a year before, the 
already jittery markets were hit by a double blow due to a horrific terrorist attack on what was 
considered to be the centre of finance of the modern world, New York City. While the actual 
damage caused by the catastrophe cannot be understated, with New York’s most recognisable 
business monument being destroyed and thousands of lives being lost in a few hours, the crisis 
was really brought into gear because of the lack of precedence and the simple shock of the 
world’s most militarily powerful country being struck on its own soil by a terrorist 
organisation. This panic was felt across the world, but most in the United States, with the S&P 
500 index falling by double digits in a week, wiping out more than a trillion dollars of investor 
wealth. Additionally, public spending increased in the defence sector for the United States in 
the succeeding years. However, since this crisis was the result of investor fear and panic instead 
of systemic faults inherent to the system, it is unrealistic to believe that it could have been 
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predicted. Having said that, since the inherent value of most stocks comprising the index was 
untouched due to this random event, the markets corrected themselves gradually to reach a 
level more indicative of their values. This entire process took less than two years, a pace much 
faster than the Dot Com crisis that took place a year earlier. Crises like these are the most 
challenging to predict because of their seemingly random occurrence. Observing global 
political and military trends is probably the most effective early indicator, if any.  
 
4. Global Financial Crisis (2008) – This particular crisis is possibly the meaningful data point for 
our particular use, as this was the severe one to hit the US stock markets since the Great 
Depression almost a century ago, at least until the COVID-19 pandemic. As a matter of fact, 
this crisis also provides good lessons in order to understand and counter the current pandemic 
crisis, given the combination of its severity and recency. One important aspect about studying 
this period of financial distress is that it has been one of the widely studied and researched 
financial crises across the world in the recent times. We have a lot of in-depth insights about 
why and how it took place, how it spread and how the regulators fell short in their duty to 
maintain a steady financial system. Perusing the research before and after the crisis, it is 
possible to logically piece together the sequence of events leading up to the meltdown and the 
inevitable consequences of the same. The ripples of this quake were felt across the global 
financial markets, both small and large. Our focal point for the purpose of this study was the 
S&P 500 – a US stock market index that was affected the most by this Black Swan event if we 
consider the pre-COVID-19 world, and hence needed to be readjusted by a high sensitivity 
factor in order to separate the effect of proximity from the calculation of severity. Given the 
multiple single day falls in the market due to this crisis, four separate instances from this period 
have been studied.  
 
5. European Crisis (2011) – Right on the heels of the 2008 crisis was the European banking crisis, 
which although much smaller in scale, exposed the systemic flaws in the debt market of the 
traditionally stable West European countries. This crisis offered a unique opportunity to 
observe how two different Black Swan events could occur in different geographies at different 
periods of time and one might still, in at least a partial way, be the effect of the other. It started 
with the unravelling of the Icelandic debt system, gradually spreading to Spain, Italy, Portugal 
and, the biggest disaster of all, Greece. The country required multiple bailouts from the 
European Central Bank and the IMF and just as it was beginning to crawl out of the ditch, it 
has possibly found itself, due to the global pandemic, requiring tremendous government 
spending in public healthcare and the loss of business due to necessary restrictions on travel 
and social distancing. 
 
6. Brexit (2016) – Brexit is the seemingly simple name given to the United Kingdom’s decision 
to leave the European Union. It was a decision taken through a nationwide referendum. While 
Brexit was devastating to the London stock market, we are measuring its impact on the US 
S&P 500 index. However, like the 1997 Asian crisis, the ripples did not cross the Atlantic 
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7. COVID-19 (2020) – This ongoing crisis is shaping up to be the biggest jolt to the world 
economy in decades, definitely the biggest of the twenty-first century yet. Unlike most of the 
previous examples (barring the 2008 crisis), which were locally focused shocks, this one is 
expected to hit almost all countries in the world noticeably. Regarding the S&P 500, eight of 
the ten biggest single day drops in its value have been recorded in the year 2020 itself, with 
the crisis expected to get worse. The data on the crisis is not complete yet and hence has not 
been assigned a local magnitude (m), thus causing it to not be considered in the sensitivity 
map. 
 
This study aimed at comparing various Black Swan events to see if there is any statistical similarity 
in the behaviour of a particular stock market in reaction to Black Swan events across the world. 
This was followed by the use of insights gained to develop a standard protocol for prediction of 
and response to a Black Swan event, depending on its severity and location.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This study primarily derived its knowledge and aimed at expanding on a study by Neil Johnson on 
the dynamics of Black Swan events understood through analysis of S&P’s index. It is not an 
analysis of cause and effect between Black Swan events and equity markets, pitching one to be the 
cause of the other. It is simply an attempt to establish correlation between the two, hypothesising 
that the forces governing the economy have a significant impact on the markets, especially free 
float markets like equity (Johnson, et al., 2012).  
A huge influence on this study was of the world-renowned book by Nicholas Nassim Taleb, 
namely The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (Musgrave, 2009). It 
comprehensively explains the need to address grave financial events that are highly unlikely, 
without considering them insignificant given the minuscule probability of their occurrence, simply 
because the impact is too drastic to ignore. It also states that it is more prudent to take preventive 
action, perpetually assuming that a Black Swan event might occur. This is because the study 
believes it is not practical to accurately predict events of this unlikely probability. Our study aims 
to identify if there is any merit in observing the sample data of Black Swan events in different 
geographies and evaluating the movements in equity markets that coincide with the arrival of 
events of such magnitude. 
Another paper that distinctly impacted our understanding of the effect of Black Swan events on 
the money market was the study by Taylor and Williams, on the significance of counterparty risk 
and the effectiveness of the Term Auction Facility in reducing interest rate spreads. This study 
deals with the effects of Black Swan events in terms of policies and interest rates. While our study 
does not particularly focus on the correction measures by central banks or governments to deal 
with devastating financial events, it was necessary to understand the reasoning behind the actions 
taken by them in order to understand the dynamics and extent of impact these events tend to have 
on national economies (Taylor & Williams, 2009).  
Additionally, since the applicability of our study needed to be verified in other mediums as well, 
we consulted the cited study to understand the effect on Black Swan events specifically on gold 
markets. Gold markets, in principle, move in a contrary direction to equity markets given the 
diverse nature of the two asset classes and their inherent risk dynamics. However, in the case of 
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Black Swan events, given their scale, there is a significant downward kink in the traded value of 
gold before it resumes its upward march, opposing the equity markets that tend to plunge (Bekiros, 
Boubaker, Nguyen, & Uddin, 2017).  
Overall, we have identified that there has been considerable amount of research on the causes and 
impact of Black Swan events on various economies as well as different asset classes. We have, 
however, identified a research gap in terms of fundamental pre-indicators of Black Swan events. 
This study aims to expand the groundwork laid by Neil Johnson’s study in its observation of equity 
markets in this specific context. We zeroed in on one equity market (S&P 500) and calculated the 
impact of various Black Swan events across the globe with respect to their impact on this reference 
point. It allowed us to establish a measure of interconnectivity in world markets in addition to the 
magnitude of the events, as well as to develop a measure to identify numerous early detection 
mechanisms by observing a singular equity market. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Secondary Data Analysis / Archival Study  
A factor to be considered while defining the period of study for the algorithm is how far back into 
history one should go in order to get data relevant to today’s prediction and response. While it is 
possible to get detailed stock data for the S&P 500 index from its inception as early as the year 
1927, it will be unhelpful to consider data that old for prediction purposes, simply because the 
dynamics of the stock market have changed dramatically to the point that any data sourced from 
that time will only reduce the accuracy of prediction without providing any insight worth 
considering.  
Thus, a recent time period of twenty or twenty-five years, which can be construed as a phase in 
the macroeconomic history of the world, was considered appropriate for the study, and we have 
identified the ideal period to be from FY 1997 to FY 2019.  
There are a number of reasons for this, one of them being the fact that this is after the fall of the 
Soviet Union and hence the political structure of the world has remained stable in the grand scheme 
of things until recently with the rise of Chinese influence on political – and, by extension, economic 
– policies, particularly in the Asian region. Possibly as a result of a largely unipolar political 
structure, we have not had any major wars on a global scale barring the US invasion of Iraq, which 
in itself was much smaller in scale compared to most wars in the twentieth century. Naturally, the 
nature of the process was ‘lookback’, meaning all assumptions and inferences were derived from 
incidents that have occurred at some time in the past.  
This means, in theory it is not possible to predict a completely unprecedented event through this 
method. However, no event is unpredictably sudden, barring a war of global proportions. Since 
there has been no such event in the period chosen, the period cannot be considered as a standard 
for all predictions. An interesting dilemma for developing a robust algorithm is whether we take 
into account major events like wars. While including them in the training naturally brings down 
the accuracy and reliability of the algorithm thanks to the rarity and unpredictability of these 
events, one might argue that a Black Swan event is inherently rare and the purpose of developing 
an algorithm to detect Black Swan events is to make sure they are detected, no matter how rare the 
occurrence.  
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The data for the S&P index was sourced from Yahoo finance (Yahoo Corporation, 2020). The 
reason for this is that we intended to check the effect of global events on any single market under 
consideration, rate each for the magnitude of its impact with relation to the market considered and 
incorporate that into the algorithm to prepare a sensitivity map for the particular market in relation 
to events taking place at different parts of the globe, with a sensitivity factor assigned to every 
country. The assignment could also be done by geography instead of country, with a group of 
interdependent countries that show similar trends towards local and global happenings being 
bunched together and assigned a single sensitivity factor. Note that the sensitivity factor is the 
market’s reaction to an event of unit magnitude occurring in a particular country or geography. To 
put the above statement in a mathematical equation,  
𝑖 = 𝑚 ∗ 𝑠 
Where,  
i = magnitude of impact on observed market, 
m = universal magnitude of impact, 
s = sensitivity factor between observed market and geography where impact has occurred. 
This method gives us an understanding of not just the effect of a severe event on the market but 
also the interconnectivity between the two economies, given the unique sensitivity factors between 
any two countries or geographies. Additionally, the impacts of every event were observed for any 
statistical similarity through a One-Way ANOVA test of their normalised values, the results of 
which have been discussed under the results section.  
In order to facilitate this, impact data prior to the sharpest decline of a day, impact in the immediate 
future since the event and impact in the further future was observed and normalised on a scale of 
0 to 1, with the highest point within prior data as well as post data assigned a rating of 1 separately 
and the other points within the respective group (either prior or post) assigned a relative rating. 
The purpose of making this adjustment was to be able to compare data from two different eras 
with two different sets of absolute values.  
Since we have defined a Black Swan event on the percentage change in the index value in a given 
period of time, the decision was made to demarcate the limits of the values within 0 and 1 and 
operate within those values.  
For the purpose of the study, we found it useful to take twenty daily data points before the crisis, 
ten daily data points during the crisis including the day the crisis started and thirty daily data points 
after the ten-day period.  
These three data sets were made for each crisis, and data from each of the data sets was studied 
together to check for statistical significance. The null hypothesis was ‘There is no significant 
difference in the means of the normalised values of pre-event data sets in the seven crises studied.’  
Each of these Black Swan events was assigned a score of 1 to 10 based on the severity felt by the 
local markets at the epicentre of the crisis. Similarly, each market was assigned a sensitivity score 
to denote the sensitivity of the S&P 500 to the events in the respective country. This was calculated 
by the drop in the average value of S&P 500 for a unit drop in the local markets at the epicentre of 
the crisis for a given short period in time. For events where the epicentre was the United States, 
the sensitivity score was naturally 1.  
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w.r.t. S&P 500 (s) 
Impact Magnitude on 
S&P 500 
(I = m*s) 
SEA Crisis 9 0.08 0.72 
Dot Com bust 6 1 6 
9/11 attacks 4 1 4 
2008 Crisis 9 1 9 
European Debt Crisis 7 0.24 1.68 
Brexit 7 0.28 1.96 
The period taken was fairly short – in this case only one day – to mitigate the possibility of multiple 
events affecting the drop in the value. This method allowed the establishment of an impact score 
to every crisis on the S&P 500 while also providing a sensitivity map for the other geographies 
studied. 
Notably, the scores for COVID-19 have not been included in the above table because the crisis 
being ongoing at the time of conducting this study, impact of the pandemic could not be fully 
measured. 
 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Pre-Event Analysis 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 












1997 20 .9793 .01967 .00440 .9701 .9885 .93 1.00 
2000 20 .9711 .01650 .00369 .9634 .9788 .94 1.00 
2001 20 .9671 .02630 .00588 .9548 .9794 .91 1.00 
2008 20 .9248 .06258 .01399 .8955 .9541 .78 1.00 
2011 20 .9716 .02638 .00590 .9592 .9839 .89 1.00 
2016 20 .9878 .00682 .00152 .9846 .9910 .98 1.00 
2020 20 .9544 .04702 .01051 .9324 .9764 .87 1.00 
Total 140 .9651 .03858 .00326 .9587 .9716 .78 1.00 
Phadnis, Joshi & Sharma | A Study Of The Effect Of Black Swan Events On Stock Markets 
121 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Pre-Event Analysis 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 












1997 20 .9793 .01967 .00440 .9701 .9885 .93 1.00 
2000 20 .9711 .01650 .00369 .9634 .9788 .94 1.00 
2001 20 .9671 .02630 .00588 .9548 .9794 .91 1.00 
2008 20 .9248 .06258 .01399 .8955 .9541 .78 1.00 
2011 20 .9716 .02638 .00590 .9592 .9839 .89 1.00 
2016 20 .9878 .00682 .00152 .9846 .9910 .98 1.00 
2020 20 .9544 .04702 .01051 .9324 .9764 .87 1.00 
 




df1 df2 Sig. 
13.922 6 133 .000 
 
 









Between Groups .051 6 .008 7.195 .000 
Within Groups .156 133 .001   
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics 
 












1997 10 .9792 .00979 .00310 .9721 .9862 .97 1.00 
2000 10 .9449 .03739 .01182 .9181 .9716 .89 1.00 
2001 10 .9722 .02271 .00718 .9560 .9885 .93 1.00 
2008 10 .9411 .04068 .01287 .9120 .9702 .89 1.00 
2011 10 .9710 .02636 .00833 .9521 .9898 .93 1.00 
2016 10 .9817 .01772 .00560 .9690 .9944 .95 1.00 
2020 10 .8834 .07160 .02264 .8322 .9346 .80 1.00 
Total 70 .9533 .04827 .00577 .9418 .9648 .80 1.00 




Table 5: Descriptive Statistics 
 












1997 10 .9792 .00979 .00310 .9721 .9862 .97 1.00 
2000 10 .9449 .03739 .01182 .9181 .9716 .89 1.00 
2001 10 .9722 .02271 .00718 .9560 .9885 .93 1.00 
2008 10 .9411 .04068 .01287 .9120 .9702 .89 1.00 
2011 10 .9710 .02636 .00833 .9521 .9898 .93 1.00 
2016 10 .9817 .01772 .00560 .9690 .9944 .95 1.00 
2020 10 .8834 .07160 .02264 .8322 .9346 .80 1.00 
Table 6: Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
 
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
11.459 6 63 .000 
Table 7: 









Between Groups .073 6 .012 8.637 .000 
Within Groups .088 63 .001   
Total .161 69    
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Figure 2: Means Plots 
Post-Event Analysis 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics  
 











1997 30 .9718 .01524 .00278 .9661 .9775 .94 1.00 
2000 30 .9600 .02728 .00498 .9498 .9702 .89 1.00 
2001 30 .9673 .01870 .00341 .9603 .9743 .93 1.00 
2008 30 .8811 .05628 .01028 .8601 .9021 .75 1.00 
2011 30 .9631 .02338 .00427 .9544 .9718 .92 1.00 
2016 30 .9904 .00633 .00116 .9880 .9928 .97 1.00 
2020 30 .9149 .06240 .01139 .8916 .9382 .76 1.00 
Total 210 .9498 .04987 .00344 .9430 .9566 .75 1.00 
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Post-Event Analysis 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics  
 











1997 30 .9718 .01524 .00278 .9661 .9775 .94 1.00 
2000 30 .9600 .02728 .00498 .9498 .9702 .89 1.00 
2001 30 .9673 .01870 .00341 .9603 .9743 .93 1.00 
2008 30 .8811 .05628 .01028 .8601 .9021 .75 1.00 
2011 30 .9631 .02338 .00427 .9544 .9718 .92 1.00 
2016 30 .9904 .00633 .00116 .9880 .9928 .97 1.00 
2020 30 .9149 .06240 .01139 .8916 .9382 .76 1.00 
 
 
Table 7: Test of Homogeneity of 
Variances 
 
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
23.981 6 203 .000 





df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .260 6 .043 33.739 .000 
Within Groups .260 203 .001   
Total .520 209    
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Figure 3: Mean Plots 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
Each of the seven selected events was taken into consideration because of its significance both at 
the local epicentre where the event actually took place as well as its ripple effect across the 
financial markets throughout the world. Since we were observing S&P 500 data, we primarily 
viewed the crisis from the lens of the US stock markets, although the same method could be applied 
to any market under consideration. In fact, in our particular case, a reverse effect may also be 
observed. The US stock markets have had an effect on global equity for years now, especially post 
globalisation, with investors from the United States investing in developing country stocks and the 
other way round.  
Findings  
1. We observed that there is a set of pre-shocks in the index values before the maximum drop 
in any given crisis. In each of the instances, we were able to observe between one and three 
minor drops in the pre-event data ranging until twenty days before the ‘black day’. This 
could be due to the reaction of certain individual or institutional investors acting 
proactively or the pessimistic investors simply withdrawing their money before a crisis. 
Although this indicator has existed in every Black Swan event, it is not sufficient to 
determine whether a crisis is of Black Swan scale, as we have observed similar minor drops 
during the other scares as well, for instance the 2011 Fukushima nuclear plant crisis in 
which the markets experienced some minor shocks that were corrected without major 
damage.  
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2. Through assigning sensitivity scores, we were able to pin the effect of various world events 
on the equity markets in the United States. Although this study is sufficient to reliably 
predict a severe downturn in any one particular market, it is not a viable option to predict 
global crises, for the simple reason that there is no market in the world that is uniformly 
sensitive to all happenings anywhere across the globe. Instead, the purpose of this study is 
to keep a market as reference and localise the effect of all crises on that particular market. 
This benefits investors, as most retail investors are active in one equity market at a time 
(Barber & Odean).  
3. Additionally, this study employs an observational approach towards the changes in values 
of the stock index, without questioning the reasons and implications of it on a fundamental 
scale. While this makes the study repeatable in different geographies, the approach might 
overlook some obvious fundamental indicators assisting in a more reliable and accurate 
prediction.  
CONCLUSION 
The current COVID-19 crisis was pitched against every other Black Swan event in modern history 
in this study, and it showed no significant similarity to any previous event – except to an extent to 
the 2008 crisis, at least from the perspective of the S&P 500 index. For all three stages – pre-event, 
event and post-event – the index has mirrored the trends of 2008, albeit on a much larger scale. 
We have observed an erratic fluctuation of values in the ten days of the event as well as thirty days 
post the event. The pre-event data from all the crises studied showed no significant difference in 
their stock values. To confirm if this is the case observed only in Black Swan events, the pre-event 
data of these events were checked for statistical similarity with other smaller downturns in the S&P 
500 index. They showed significant differences in most cases, barring the Asian Crisis, which 
showed no significant difference. This may be because while the 1997 crisis was devastating for 
the South East Asian countries, its effect was not felt in the S&P 500 to a major extent, hence it 
mirrored smaller domestic downturns in the American market.  
As explained in the literature review, this study primarily aimed to expand on the research by Neil 
Johnson’s study (Johnson, et al., 2012), by implementing a similar approach towards the problem 
of studying Black Swan events, namely through observing equity markets. This study tries to fill 
up the gap of predictive analysis of the markets in order to identify actionable insights into a Black 
Swan event before its impact is felt.  
The uniqueness of the study lies in its attempt to evaluate the interconnectivity between major 
markets in the world through the assignment of sensitivity scores for each market reference point 
– in this case, the S&P 500. Additionally, we have used statistical tools to reinforce our claims that 
various Black Swan events in history across various geographies have a statistical similarity even 
with the current COVID-19 crisis and hence can be used to generate actionable insights in order 
to identify early indicators in that regard. 
Practical Implications  
 We have established a table that can be used to identify S&P 500’s sensitivity to various world 
markets. Additionally, the insights generated through studying the previous Black Swan events 
have been tested on the current COVID-19 crisis and have generated statistically significant, 
accurate predictions. The results have been mentioned in the Results and Analysis section, as well 
as a detailed set of observations in the Annexure. 
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Recommendations 
Although this requires further understanding by performing a similar exercise for other indices 
across the world to convincingly make a statement, we have found in our study that data from 
approximately fifteen days before the actual event provides a fair understanding of the possibility 
of a Black Swan event. As mentioned earlier, the sensitivity score was a ratio of the drop in the 
market under consideration (in our case S&P 500) to the drop in the markets at the local epicentre 
of the crisis. This method of analysis could be subject to scrutiny, as a drop in a market could be 
the result of multiple factors at once – some local and others global. However, we have observed 
that that the characteristics of the market before a Black Swan event provide a specific downturn 
unique only to the events of equivalent magnitude. Running an ANOVA test on any consecutive 
fifteen-day period compared with the events studied in this study will provide a p-value signifying 
its relationship with them. A statistical similarity observed is a warning sign, applicable at best 
five days before the biggest downturn. Regarding severe global financial crises not causing a 
significant impact on the market under observation, we found no significant patterns from the point 
of view of the foreign market under observation. Meaning that in our case, we found no significant 
changes in the patterns of the S&P 500 index, if the crisis had an epicentre elsewhere in the world 
in an economy decoupled from the American markets, as in the case of the South East Asian crisis. 
A possible work-around for this could be establishing a similar study from the point of view of 
multiple major markets around the world and conducting an analysis of each as if it was the 
epicentre. This would give us a better judgment of the magnitude for each of the crises individually, 
in turn helping reinforce the relative measurements. 
Limitations 
Since the calculations are normalised, that is, performed on a relative basis, they might not 
adequately consider the effect of events that have had an absolute impact on the values of the 
index. For instance, if a set of investors regularly withdraw and reinvest their fixed corpus in the 
market at different points in time, the effect of those transactions would not follow an increase or 
decrease pattern of the index proportionally. Instead its effect will remain steady in terms of 
absolute money injected into the market or withdrawn from it. In this case, our method is likely to 
understate or overstate this particular effect in conditions different than the base, with a bigger 
base causing overstating effect and a smaller one causing a corresponding understating.  
The scope of the study is limited to the movements in the stock market, in this particular case the 
movement of S&P 500. The qualitative and quantitative factors governing the movement are 
beyond the scope of this particular study. Instead, this study deals with the combined effect of the 
factors on the movement of the stock index. The implications of this could be felt in a more 
pronounced manner after a couple of decades, when the dynamics of the equity market are 
completely different, at which point this study will become obsolete and a newer understanding of 
the dynamics must be applied. 
The lookback nature of the study makes it so that all observations and hence all insights have been 
derived from historical precedence. To this end, while the other limitations of the study are a result 
of cost restrictions, time restrictions or simply a lapse in understanding, this particular one is a 
result of the inherent limitation of an error in predicting the future. As we continue to experience 
events that are unique and extreme in nature, the algorithm will keep getting better in terms of 
efficiency. 
 




Furnished below is the detailed inter-event comparison study in the three phases – pre-event, event and post-event 
scenarios. 
Multiple Comparisons  
Dependent Variable: Values (Pre-event) 
 
 
 (I) Group (J) Group 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
 





2000 .00817 .01084 1.000 -.0254 .0417 
2001 .01216 .01084 1.000 -.0214 .0457 
2008 .05445* .01084 .000 .0209 .0880 
2011 .00771 .01084 1.000 -.0259 .0413 
2016 -.00854 .01084 1.000 -.0421 .0250 
2020 .02485 .01084 .492 -.0087 .0584 
2000 
dimension3  
1997 -.00817 .01084 1.000 -.0417 .0254 
2001 .00399 .01084 1.000 -.0296 .0376 
2008 .04629* .01084 .001 .0127 .0799 
2011 -.00046 .01084 1.000 -.0340 .0331 
2016 -.01670 .01084 1.000 -.0503 .0169 
2020 .01668 .01084 1.000 -.0169 .0503 
2001 
dimension3  
1997 -.01216 .01084 1.000 -.0457 .0214 
2000 -.00399 .01084 1.000 -.0376 .0296 
2008 .04230* .01084 .003 .0087 .0759 
2011 -.00445 .01084 1.000 -.0380 .0291 
2016 -.02070 .01084 1.000 -.0543 .0129 
2020 .01269 .01084 1.000 -.0209 .0463 
2008 
dimension3  
1997 -.05445* .01084 .000 -.0880 -.0209 
2000 -.04629* .01084 .001 -.0799 -.0127 
AABFJ  |  Volume 15, No.1, 2021 
130 
2001 -.04230* .01084 .003 -.0759 -.0087 
2011 -.04675* .01084 .001 -.0803 -.0132 
2016 -.06299* .01084 .000 -.0966 -.0294 
2020 -.02960 .01084 .150 -.0632 .0040 
2011 
dimension3  
1997 -.00771 .01084 1.000 -.0413 .0259 
2000 .00046 .01084 1.000 -.0331 .0340 
2001 .00445 .01084 1.000 -.0291 .0380 
2008 .04675* .01084 .001 .0132 .0803 
2016 -.01625 .01084 1.000 -.0498 .0173 
2020 .01714 .01084 1.000 -.0164 .0507 
2016 
dimension3  
1997 .00854 .01084 1.000 -.0250 .0421 
2000 .01670 .01084 1.000 -.0169 .0503 
2001 .02070 .01084 1.000 -.0129 .0543 
2008 .06299* .01084 .000 .0294 .0966 
2011 .01625 .01084 1.000 -.0173 .0498 
2020 .03339 .01084 .053 -.0002 .0670 
2020 
dimension3  
1997 -.02485 .01084 .492 -.0584 .0087 
2000 -.01668 .01084 1.000 -.0503 .0169 
2001 -.01269 .01084 1.000 -.0463 .0209 
2008 .02960 .01084 .150 -.0040 .0632 
2011 -.01714 .01084 1.000 -.0507 .0164 





2000 .00817 .00574 .976 -.0105 .0268 
2001 .01216 .00734 .907 -.0118 .0361 
2008 .05445* .01467 .024 .0045 .1045 
2011 .00771 .00736 .999 -.0163 .0317 
2016 -.00854 .00466 .824 -.0243 .0073 
2020 .02485 .01140 .563 -.0135 .0632 
2000 
dimension3  
1997 -.00817 .00574 .976 -.0268 .0105 
Phadnis, Joshi & Sharma | A Study Of The Effect Of Black Swan Events On Stock Markets 
131 
2001 .00399 .00694 1.000 -.0189 .0268 
2008 .04629 .01447 .085 -.0033 .0959 
2011 -.00046 .00696 1.000 -.0234 .0224 
2016 -.01670* .00399 .006 -.0301 -.0033 
2020 .01668 .01114 .965 -.0211 .0545 
2001 
dimension3  
1997 -.01216 .00734 .907 -.0361 .0118 
2000 -.00399 .00694 1.000 -.0268 .0189 
2008 .04230 .01518 .189 -.0088 .0933 
2011 -.00445 .00833 1.000 -.0315 .0226 
2016 -.02070 .00608 .053 -.0415 .0002 
2020 .01269 .01205 .999 -.0272 .0526 
2008 
dimension3  
1997 -.05445* .01467 .024 -.1045 -.0045 
2000 -.04629 .01447 .085 -.0959 .0033 
2001 -.04230 .01518 .189 -.0933 .0088 
2011 -.04675 .01519 .098 -.0978 .0043 
2016 -.06299* .01408 .005 -.1120 -.0140 
2020 -.02960 .01750 .890 -.0868 .0275 
2011 
dimension3  
1997 -.00771 .00736 .999 -.0317 .0163 
2000 .00046 .00696 1.000 -.0224 .0234 
2001 .00445 .00833 1.000 -.0226 .0315 
2008 .04675 .01519 .098 -.0043 .0978 
2016 -.01625 .00609 .260 -.0372 .0047 
2020 .01714 .01206 .978 -.0228 .0571 
2016 
dimension3  
1997 .00854 .00466 .824 -.0073 .0243 
2000 .01670* .00399 .006 .0033 .0301 
2001 .02070 .00608 .053 -.0002 .0415 
2008 .06299* .01408 .005 .0140 .1120 
2011 .01625 .00609 .260 -.0047 .0372 
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2020 .03339 .01062 .103 -.0035 .0703 
2020 
dimension3  
1997 -.02485 .01140 .563 -.0632 .0135 
2000 -.01668 .01114 .965 -.0545 .0211 
2001 -.01269 .01205 .999 -.0526 .0272 
2008 .02960 .01750 .890 -.0275 .0868 
2011 -.01714 .01206 .978 -.0571 .0228 
2016 -.03339 .01062 .103 -.0703 .0035 




Multiple Comparisons  




















2000 .03428 .01673 .937 -.0187 .0873 
2001 .00693 .01673 1.000 -.0461 .0599 
2008 .03805 .01673 .554 -.0149 .0910 
2011 .00817 .01673 1.000 -.0448 .0611 
2016 -.00253 .01673 1.000 -.0555 .0504 
2020 .09578* .01673 .000 .0428 .1488 
2000 
 
1997 -.03428 .01673 .937 -.0873 .0187 
2001 -.02736 .01673 1.000 -.0803 .0256 
2008 .00376 .01673 1.000 -.0492 .0567 
2011 -.02612 .01673 1.000 -.0791 .0269 
2016 -.03682 .01673 .661 -.0898 .0162 
2020 .06150* .01673 .010 .0085 .1145 
2001 
 
1997 -.00693 .01673 1.000 -.0599 .0461 
2000 .02736 .01673 1.000 -.0256 .0803 
2008 .03112 .01673 1.000 -.0219 .0841 
2011 .00124 .01673 1.000 -.0517 .0542 
2016 -.00946 .01673 1.000 -.0624 .0435 
2020 .08885* .01673 .000 .0359 .1418 




1997 -.03805 .01673 .554 -.0910 .0149 
2000 -.00376 .01673 1.000 -.0567 .0492 
2001 -.03112 .01673 1.000 -.0841 .0219 
2011 -.02988 .01673 1.000 -.0829 .0231 
2016 -.04058 .01673 .382 -.0936 .0124 
2020 .05773* .01673 .021 .0048 .1107 
2011 
 
1997 -.00817 .01673 1.000 -.0611 .0448 
2000 .02612 .01673 1.000 -.0269 .0791 
2001 -.00124 .01673 1.000 -.0542 .0517 
2008 .02988 .01673 1.000 -.0231 .0829 
2016 -.01070 .01673 1.000 -.0637 .0423 
2020 .08761* .01673 .000 .0346 .1406 
2016 
 
1997 .00253 .01673 1.000 -.0504 .0555 
2000 .03682 .01673 .661 -.0162 .0898 
2001 .00946 .01673 1.000 -.0435 .0624 
2008 .04058 .01673 .382 -.0124 .0936 
2011 .01070 .01673 1.000 -.0423 .0637 
2020 .09831* .01673 .000 .0453 .1513 
2020 
 
1997 -.09578* .01673 .000 -.1488 -.0428 
2000 -.06150* .01673 .010 -.1145 -.0085 
2001 -.08885* .01673 .000 -.1418 -.0359 
2008 -.05773* .01673 .021 -.1107 -.0048 
2011 -.08761* .01673 .000 -.1406 -.0346 
2016 -.09831* .01673 .000 -.1513 -.0453 
Tamhane  1997  2000 .03428 .01222 .321 -.0145 .0831 
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2001 .00693 .00782 1.000 -.0228 .0367 
2008 .03805 .01323 .294 -.0151 .0912 
2011 .00817 .00889 1.000 -.0262 .0426 
2016 -.00253 .00640 1.000 -.0261 .0211 
2020 .09578* .02285 .044 .0019 .1897 
2000 
 
1997 -.03428 .01222 .321 -.0831 .0145 
2001 -.02736 .01383 .766 -.0778 .0230 
2008 .00376 .01747 1.000 -.0578 .0654 
2011 -.02612 .01447 .861 -.0780 .0257 
2016 -.03682 .01308 .268 -.0860 .0123 
2020 .06150 .02554 .483 -.0333 .1563 
2001 
 
1997 -.00693 .00782 1.000 -.0367 .0228 
2000 .02736 .01383 .766 -.0230 .0778 
2008 .03112 .01473 .681 -.0231 .0854 
2011 .00124 .01100 1.000 -.0376 .0401 
2016 -.00946 .00911 1.000 -.0418 .0229 
2020 .08885 .02375 .068 -.0045 .1822 
2008 
 
1997 -.03805 .01323 .294 -.0912 .0151 
2000 -.00376 .01747 1.000 -.0654 .0578 
2001 -.03112 .01473 .681 -.0854 .0231 
2011 -.02988 .01533 .781 -.0853 .0256 
2016 -.04058 .01403 .244 -.0939 .0127 
2020 .05773 .02604 .606 -.0379 .1534 
2011 
 
1997 -.00817 .00889 1.000 -.0426 .0262 
2000 .02612 .01447 .861 -.0257 .0780 
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2001 -.00124 .01100 1.000 -.0401 .0376 
2008 .02988 .01533 .781 -.0256 .0853 
2016 -.01070 .01004 .999 -.0469 .0255 
2020 .08761 .02413 .076 -.0058 .1810 
2016 
 
1997 .00253 .00640 1.000 -.0211 .0261 
2000 .03682 .01308 .268 -.0123 .0860 
2001 .00946 .00911 1.000 -.0229 .0418 
2008 .04058 .01403 .244 -.0127 .0939 
2011 .01070 .01004 .999 -.0255 .0469 
2020 .09831* .02332 .036 .0048 .1918 
2020 
 
1997 -.09578* .02285 .044 -.1897 -.0019 
2000 -.06150 .02554 .483 -.1563 .0333 
2001 -.08885 .02375 .068 -.1822 .0045 
2008 -.05773 .02604 .606 -.1534 .0379 
2011 -.08761 .02413 .076 -.1810 .0058 
2016 -.09831* .02332 .036 -.1918 -.0048 
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable: Values (Post-Event) 
 (I) Group3 (J) Group3 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 








2000 .01178 .00924 1.000 -.0167 .0402 
2001 .00453 .00924 1.000 -.0239 .0330 
2008 .09066* .00924 .000 .0622 .1191 
2011 .00871 .00924 1.000 -.0197 .0372 
2016 -.01860 .00924 .957 -.0470 .0098 
2020 .05690* .00924 .000 .0285 .0853 
2000 
dimension3  
1997 -.01178 .00924 1.000 -.0402 .0167 
2001 -.00725 .00924 1.000 -.0357 .0212 
2008 .07888* .00924 .000 .0504 .1073 
2011 -.00306 .00924 1.000 -.0315 .0254 
2016 -.03037* .00924 .025 -.0588 -.0019 
2020 .04512* .00924 .000 .0167 .0736 
2001 
dimension3  
1997 -.00453 .00924 1.000 -.0330 .0239 
2000 .00725 .00924 1.000 -.0212 .0357 
2008 .08614* .00924 .000 .0577 .1146 
2011 .00419 .00924 1.000 -.0243 .0326 
2016 -.02312 .00924 .277 -.0516 .0053 
2020 .05238* .00924 .000 .0239 .0808 
2008 
dimension3  
1997 -.09066* .00924 .000 -.1191 -.0622 
2000 -.07888* .00924 .000 -.1073 -.0504 
2001 -.08614* .00924 .000 -.1146 -.0577 
2011 -.08195* .00924 .000 -.1104 -.0535 
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2016 -.10926* .00924 .000 -.1377 -.0808 
2020 -.03376* .00924 .007 -.0622 -.0053 
2011 
dimension3  
1997 -.00871 .00924 1.000 -.0372 .0197 
2000 .00306 .00924 1.000 -.0254 .0315 
2001 -.00419 .00924 1.000 -.0326 .0243 
2008 .08195* .00924 .000 .0535 .1104 
2016 -.02731 .00924 .074 -.0558 .0011 
2020 .04819* .00924 .000 .0197 .0766 
2016 
dimension3  
1997 .01860 .00924 .957 -.0098 .0470 
2000 .03037* .00924 .025 .0019 .0588 
2001 .02312 .00924 .277 -.0053 .0516 
2008 .10926* .00924 .000 .0808 .1377 
2011 .02731 .00924 .074 -.0011 .0558 
2020 .07550* .00924 .000 .0471 .1039 
2020 
dimension3  
1997 -.05690* .00924 .000 -.0853 -.0285 
2000 -.04512* .00924 .000 -.0736 -.0167 
2001 -.05238* .00924 .000 -.0808 -.0239 
2008 .03376* .00924 .007 .0053 .0622 
2011 -.04819* .00924 .000 -.0766 -.0197 





2000 .01178 .00571 .617 -.0065 .0301 
2001 .00453 .00441 1.000 -.0095 .0185 
2008 .09066* .01065 .000 .0557 .1256 
2011 .00871 .00510 .873 -.0076 .0250 
2016 -.01860* .00301 .000 -.0284 -.0088 
2020 .05690* .01173 .001 .0184 .0954 
2000 
dimension3  
1997 -.01178 .00571 .617 -.0301 .0065 
2001 -.00725 .00604 .996 -.0265 .0120 
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2008 .07888* .01142 .000 .0421 .1157 
2011 -.00306 .00656 1.000 -.0239 .0177 
2016 -.03037* .00511 .000 -.0472 -.0136 
2020 .04512* .01243 .017 .0049 .0854 
2001 
dimension3  
1997 -.00453 .00441 1.000 -.0185 .0095 
2000 .00725 .00604 .996 -.0120 .0265 
2008 .08614* .01083 .000 .0508 .1215 
2011 .00419 .00547 1.000 -.0132 .0215 
2016 -.02312* .00361 .000 -.0349 -.0114 
2020 .05238* .01189 .002 .0135 .0913 
2008 
dimension3  
1997 -.09066* .01065 .000 -.1256 -.0557 
2000 -.07888* .01142 .000 -.1157 -.0421 
2001 -.08614* .01083 .000 -.1215 -.0508 
2011 -.08195* .01113 .000 -.1180 -.0459 
2016 -.10926* .01034 .000 -.1435 -.0750 
2020 -.03376 .01534 .493 -.0824 .0149 
2011 
dimension3  
1997 -.00871 .00510 .873 -.0250 .0076 
2000 .00306 .00656 1.000 -.0177 .0239 
2001 -.00419 .00547 1.000 -.0215 .0132 
2008 .08195* .01113 .000 .0459 .1180 
2016 -.02731* .00442 .000 -.0418 -.0128 
2020 .04819* .01217 .007 .0086 .0878 
2016 
dimension3  
1997 .01860* .00301 .000 .0088 .0284 
2000 .03037* .00511 .000 .0136 .0472 
2001 .02312* .00361 .000 .0114 .0349 
2008 .10926* .01034 .000 .0750 .1435 
2011 .02731* .00442 .000 .0128 .0418 
2020 .07550* .01145 .000 .0376 .1134 




1997 -.05690* .01173 .001 -.0954 -.0184 
2000 -.04512* .01243 .017 -.0854 -.0049 
2001 -.05238* .01189 .002 -.0913 -.0135 
2008 .03376 .01534 .493 -.0149 .0824 
2011 -.04819* .01217 .007 -.0878 -.0086 
2016 -.07550* .01145 .000 -.1134 -.0376 
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